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' Case No. 7614 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTiHI I-"' ~~J~ ]f) 
ROGER T. HARMS TON, as Administrat&F---- ----- -- -·--- ----- ---- ----___ __ _ 
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Cle< k, Suprenu~ Cour t, ~~;t::1h 
Deceased, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Respondent. 
District Court Docket No. 2437 
and 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton, 
deceased, HELENE E. GILLIS, MARION 
EUGENE HARMSTON, ROGER T. 
HARMSTON and FRED HARMSTON, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN 
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and 
EDGAR LABRUM and VEDA MURRAY 
LABRUM, his wife, 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A 
REHEARING 
J. RULON MORGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, 
Deceased, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
F ARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK, 
a Utah corporation, 
Respondent. 
District Court Docket No. 2437 
and 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as Administrator 
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton, 
deceased; HELENE E. GILLIS, MARION 
EUGENE HARMSTON, ROGER T. 
HARMSTON and FRED HARMSTON, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN 
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and 
EDGAR LABRUM and VEDA MURRAY 
LABRUM, his wife, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 7614 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A 
REHEARING 
RESTATEMENT oF REsPONDENTs' PosiTION 
In the opening brief in support of respondents' peti-
tion for a rehearing, the attention of this court was di-
rected to the fact that all of the cases and authorities 
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cited by this court in support of its opinion heretofore 
'vritten were cases and authorities holding that one who 
relied directly upon a judgment to support a claimed 
right must, so to speak, reconstruct or re-esta:blish such 
a judgment by producing evidence to show that the judg-
Inent was either not in accord with the judgment intended 
by the court, or was incomplete because of some of the 
record thereof had been lost or destroyed. We also, in 
respondents' opening brief, directed the attention of the 
court to the statement of the law together with the numer-
ous cases cited in Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, 
page 2145, wherein it is held that parol evidence is prop-
erly admitted to show the existence and contents of a lost 
judgment roll and to re-establish the same. It is there 
said and the cases cited in.a foot notH show that the great 
weight of authority support the rule announc~d by Green-
leaf rather than that stated by Wigmore., cited in the 
opinion heretofore written. We further directed the 
attention of the court to the fact that there was no 
occasion to re-establish or reconstruct the judgment 
involved in this controversy. Those judgments are full 
and complete in every particular. Personal service of 
summons was had upon Roger T. Harmston, as admin-
istrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. The 
Court found that Roger T. Harmston was such duly 
appointed, qualified and acting administrator. We shall 
not again review the evidence which tended to show that 
Roger T. Harmston had taken the oath of office. Suffice 
it to say that the trial court so found and there is 
evidence that the oath of office was then in the files and 
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offered in evidence at the 1nortgage foreclosure hearing, 
and the plain tiff herein did not deny that he had taken 
the oath of office and had even forgotten that he had 
furnished a bond and during a period of 1nore than seven 
years had paid the pre1niun1s thereon. 
THE CAsEs CITED BY APPELLANTS Do NoT SuPPOR'T 
THEIR CoNTENTION 
":e have recently been served with a brief on behalf 
of the appellants and have carefully read the cases and 
authorities there cited. As we read the cases, not one of 
them support the contention of the appellants herein. 
A number of them sup·port the position of the respond-
ents. Lest we be chargeable with making an unjustifiable 
statement about such cases, we will briefly review the 
same. 
The case of Miebra v. Sloss Sheffield Steel 
and I. Co., 182 Ala. 622-62 So. 176-46 LRA (NS) 274 is 
an appeal where it is held that oral evidence may not be 
admitted to show that someone other than that shown 
by the record was appointed as administrator of an 
estate. 
Pape v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 
200 Ga. 69-35 S.E. 2d 899 on appeal holds that on direct 
attack in nature of equitable proceedings on public rec-
ords, parol evidence is admissible to impeach the record. 
It is further held that ·an investigator may rely on the 
truth of specific recitals contained in a public record, 
and that the one relying upon public records is protected, 
not only by the natural equities of his position, but also 
by the special equities arising from the protection afford-
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ed everyone who relies upon the record. In this case for 
nearly seven years there was a public record full and 
complete showing that the mortgages were properly 
foreclosed. That was the basis for the Farmers and 
Merchants Bank buying the property at the foreclosure 
sale, and that was probably the basis for the Labrums 
buying the p-roperty from the Bank. 
In Gaulding v. Madison, 179 N.C. 461-102, 'S.E. 851, 
10 ALR 1497 it is held in a case on appeal that where a 
record in a former action is relevant in the present one, 
the record itself is the only evidence admissible to prove 
its contents, unless it is shown by the party desiring it, 
with the burden of proof on him, that it once existed and 
has been lost or having existed it cannot be produced. 
It is there said: "The principle established in these ad-
judications is that parol p-roof is admissible and only 
admissrble in aid of the record, that is whenever the 
record of the first trial fails to disclose the precise point 
on which it was decided; that there must however be a 
record to be aided." 
In Fleming v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Ellsworth County, 119 Kan. 598-240 P. 591 it was held 
on appeal that an order laying out road cannot be modi-
fied by parol evidence. 
In Spa.ulding et al v. City of Lebanon, 156 Ky. 37 
160 S.W. 751-49 LRA (NS) 387 on appeal it is held that 
where a city charter p-rovides that no ordinance for the 
establishment of any license shall be valid unless the 
yeas and nays thereon were recorded in the journal of 
the proceedings of the counsel and the journal failed to 
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~ho\Y that the yeas and nays \Yere taken or that the ordi-
nance \Vas passed, parol evidence wa.s inadmissible to 
~how these facts. 
In People v. Pfeiffer et al v. Morris et al, 365 Ill. 
470, 6 N.E. 2d 864 on appeal it is held that where· offi-
cials are required to keep a record, such record consti-
tutes the only lawful evidence and cannot be supple-
Inented by parol evidence. 
In Patterson v. Crow, 385 Ill. 514-53 N.E. 2d 415 on 
appeal it is held that the election contest was filed too 
late. In the course of the opinion it is said that the record 
to be kept by public officers is the only proper evidence 
of what occurred. 
In the case of Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Up·pe.r 
Potomac Steamboat Co., 109 U.S. 672-27 L. ed. 1070 3 
S. Ct. 445-4 S. ·Ct. 15 is an op·inion covering 30 pages de-
voted to a discussion of whether the city of Washington 
or certain property owners of land abutting on the Po-
tomac River had the right to construct piers and docks on 
the Potomac River. The only reference in the opinion 
which even remotely touches the question here p·resented 
is that '''preliminary oral negotiations -are merged in the 
writing finally agreed upon where such writing is not am-
biguous." 
In the case of Ex parte v. Young, 154 Cal. 317-97 
Pac. 822-22 LRA (NS) 330 it is held on appeal that where 
record shows that an ordinance was duly p·assed, oral 
evidence that it was not passed was inadmissible. 
In the case of Re Evingson 2 N.D. 184----49 N.W. 733-
33 Am. St. Ref. 768 it is held on ap·pe:al as stated in ap·-
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pellants' brief that necessary presumptions arising front 
the record cannot be contradicted by parol evidence. 
In Strong v. United States, 6 Wall U.S. 788-18 L. ed. 
740, it is held that private books of a government dis-
bursing agent are inadmissible to control accounts as 
kept by accounting officers of treasury department. 
Counsel for appellants directs the attention of the 
court to his claim that there was a lack of jurisdiction, 
but certainly none of the cases cited by him even remotely 
deals with the matter of jurisdiction. Certainly the court 
in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding had jurisdiction 
to determine whether or not Harmston had taken an 
oath of office. It was so alleged and found. 
The fact that the plaintiffs and appellants herein 
have not cited any authority which supports their con-
tention would seem to indicate that none can be· found. 
It should be kept in mind in reviewing the authorities 
that the respondents did not offer any evidence, written 
or parol, which tended to impeach the judgment here 
brought in question. It was the plaintiffs who sought 
to impeach the judgments in the mortgage foreclosure, 
not by anything that appeared in those judgments, but by 
what did not appear in the estate of Isabelle T. Harms-
ton. If, as is said in a number of the cases cited by the 
plaintiffs, the record as shown by the judgment roll is the 
only evidence admissible as to the judgment, then it fol-
lows that what did not appear in the Isabelle T. Harms-
ton estate proceedings would be incompetent, and if com-
petent would not defe-at the validity of the judgment he·re 
brought in question. In this case it is obvious that what 
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appellants seek to establish by the failure of the files 
in the Isabelle T. Harn1ston estate n1atter is to show that 
R.oger T. Har1nston failed to take an oath of office. Such 
clain1 is at \Yar not only as to 'vhat is expressly found by 
the trial court in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, 
but at variance \Yith all of the oral evidence offered in 
support of \Yhat was found to be the fact by the trial 
court in the n1ortgage foreclosure proceedings. It seems 
to be suggested by plaintiffs in their brief that the fact 
of Harmston taking his o~th of office must be shown by 
the record and could not properly be shown by the ori-
ginal oath of office. If such be the position of the plain-
tiffs, then such contention is at variance with what we 
have al,vays understood to be the law. The rule as to the 
requirements that the best evidence be p·roduced, dictates 
that the original oath of office should be produced, if 
available, and not the record thereof. Such evidence 
as there is, including the finding of the trial court, is 
to the effect that the oath of office was offered in evi-
dence in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
It is the appellants and not the re·spondents who 
seek to vary the terms of the judgment here involved 
by resorting solely to another case which is not directly 
here involved. If that may be done, a judgment regular 
on its face in which personal service has been had upon 
the defendant may be held for naught after the lapse of 
nearly seven years, not because of any defect in such 
judgment, but solely because of the failure· of some other 
record to reveal that the party sued had failed to file 
his oath of office. If that may be done as to the Isabelle 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
T. Ha.rmston estate, by the same process of reasoning 
it 1nay be done as to any other number of probate pro-
ceedings through which Isabelle T. Harmston may have 
acquired title. 
If judgments of courts of general jurisdiction are 
to be so lightly treated, then indeed have they lost the 
sancitity that has heretofore been accorded them by the 
courts. In this case no useful purpose can be served by 
a proceeding to re-establish or reconstruct what was 
done in the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. The plain-
tiff, Roger T. Harmston, has admittedly now taken an 
oath of office. Respondents' title does not res·t upon what 
was done in the Isabelle T. H·armston estate, but upon 
what was done in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
What was found as a fact in the mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings is certainly enti tied to more weight as to the 
matter of Roger T. Harmston having taken an oath of 
office in the Isabelle T. Harms ton estate than in the fail-
ure of the record in the estate matter to show that he did 
not take such oath, especially in light of the facts testi-
fied to by J. Rulon Morgan and the Clerk of the Court 
of Duchesne County and his assistants. 
We submit that if a p:arty to an action who has been 
personally served with summons may fail to answer such 
a summons, permit judgment by default to be taken 
against him, ·and the property foreclosed to be taken oiVer 
by a purchaser for nearly seven years after the issuance 
of a Sheriff's Deed, and stand by without protest while 
some of such property is sold, and then come into court 
and succeed in having such a judgment set aside because 
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of the absence of a record in some proceeding not dire-ctly 
involved in the judgment sought to be vacated, then in-
deed have courts of general jurisdiction ceased to be a 
protection to those who have heretofore been protected 
in reliance thereon. 
We submit that a rehearing should be granted, and 
upon such re-hearing, the judgment appealed from be 
affirmed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. RULON MORGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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